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EuropE Within thE World  
of rEgionalisms
It was initially the emergence of the three core regions of the triad (North America, Eu-
rope and North East Asia-Pacific) and the related scramble to conclude Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) in the late 1980s and early 1990s that drew attention to the rise 
of a new world order, closely entangled with a “world of regions” (Katzenstein, 2001; 
Bach, 2017) that had previously been ignored or deemed of marginal significance. In 
the early 1990s, the global geopolitical implications of the processes observed in North 
East Asia, but also among the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization 
prompted the reassessment of the potential of network-led (as opposed to institution-
ally driven) integration. APEC’s specific model of “open regionalism” combined en-
ticing national macro-economic policies with an ability to create new opportunities 
for entrepreneurial diasporas and corporate players (Ravenhill, 2001). The formation 
and dissemination of Global Value Chains (GVCs) across national boundaries was the 
emblematic feature of this momentum. In Latin America, import-substitution indus-
trialisation behind tariff walls was also replaced by market-oriented programmes and 
neo-liberal reforms directly inspired by APEC (ECLAC, 1994: 11). In North America, 
too, the USA, Canada and Mexico were similarly asserting a commitment to regional-
ism through the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in 1992. It is against this background that the “new” regionalism literature undertook 
to make sense of a diversification of goals and processes that were underwritten by the 
universal endorsement of multilateralism.
The intellectual legacy of the 1990s resides primarily in its contribution to the dis-
semination of the analytical distinction between regionalism and integration. The no-
tion of regionalism accounts for ideas or ideologies, programs, policies and goals that 
seek to transform an identified social space into a regional project. Since regionalism 
postulates the implementation of a program and the definition of a strategy, it is often 
associated with institution-building or the conclusion of formal agreements. Regional-
ism can also relate to the production, invention or reinvention of transnational identi-
ties, a process concomitant with the delineation of mental maps and boundaries. By 
contrast, regionalisation focuses on the build-up of interactions which may or may not 
relate to an explicitly asserted or acknowledged regionalist project. Regionalisation is 
a more encompassing notion than regionalism, since it takes into account processes and 
configurations in which states are frequently not the key players. Regionalisation may 
correlate with the implementation of regionalist strategies and translate into processes 
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of cross-border integration. Regionalisation can grow irrespective of state policies and 
at times even in opposition to their stated purpose. In Africa, as in Asia or the Middle 
East, the diasporic networks associated with trade or labour migration do not carry any 
particular ambition to build regional integration. At the same time, the aggregation of 
individual strategies stimulates cross-border and trans-regional integration processes 
through the development of markets located in the borderlands that may contribute to 
the emergence of global hubs and nodes, as famously illustrated by the city of Doha. In 
such cases, regionalisation is entangled with state policies and corporate strategies that 
thrive from the instrumentalisation of opportunities created by fiscal, tariff or norma-
tive incentives, as much as from the “porosity” of frontiers.
Since the turn of the millennium, newer forms of regionalism have emerged, initial-
ly dubbed 21st-century regionalism (Baldwin, 2011) or, in the case of Latin America, 
‘post-hegemonic’ (The Rise, 2017). As the latter notion implies, regionalism has be-
come entangled with disillusions generated by multilateral trade negotiations, a move-
ment comforted by the election of Donald Trump and his pledge to renegotiate (or 
withdraw from) regional agreements and multilateral negotiations. The global ambi-
tions simultaneously associated with China’s “New Silk Road” (a.k.a Belt and Road) 
initiative also mean that trade negotiations across the world are more than ever entan-
gled with geopolitical considerations that are stimulated by the competing ambition of 
China, the USA and the EU as global norms makers.
The interplay between regionalism and the concept of “region” have in the proc-
ess become increasingly diffuse. The issue has only gained acuity with current plans 
towards the formation of mega-regional RTAs, tying together countries that are in 
a “paramount driver position or serve as hubs in global value chains,” as in the case of 
the US, the EU, Japan or China (Meléndez-Ortiz, 2014: 13).
The following pages argue that the study of African regionalisms constitutes a timely 
invitation to revisit the experience of EU and its contribution to the world of regional-
isms. After a review the ongoing relevance of European integration we will draw from 
the study of Africa five threads which set the basis for a comparative study of regions and 
regionalisms beyond the classic emphasis on the EU or the world of regions.
nEithEr old nor nEW: EuropEan intEgration  
as an unfolding ExpEriEncE
The assumption that newer forms of regionalism meant that the EU would become an 
outdated (“old”) model of region-building never materialized. The global revival of 
regionalism in the 1990s owed much to the EU’s completion of a single market, the 
adoption of the Maastricht treaty and the process of expansion to eastern and central 
countries that contributed to secure their transitions towards democratisation and the 
market economy. The EU, through structural funds and pre-accession packages, gave 
substance to a process of region-building that through “self-proclaimed empiricism 
and ad hoc compromises” (Dehousse, 2000: 1–2) managed to enhance its global mar-
ket integration while implementing common policies and a regulation of the costs and 
benefits of integration among members, e.g. through structural funds.
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Across Europe (in conjunction with the lure of EU membership), Africa and Latin 
America (through the establishment of Mercosur), the EU was celebrated for its ability 
to transcend strict neo-liberal or linear prescriptions on regional economic integration. 
In Latin America, this informed the establishment of Mercosur (1991), while in Africa, 
the revision of the treaties of the regional economic communities was equally inspired 
by the EU, viewed as a path to region-building particularly well suited to fulfil the 
goals and ideals of Pan-Africanism. In Asia and the Pacific, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) was equally explicit about its ambition to emulate, the EU’s structural and 
regional programmes in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece as part of its own strategy 
towards developmental regionalism. The ability to reduce core-periphery disparities 
and bridge development gaps featured at the core of the Bank’s reinterpretation of 
developmental regionalism as “a capacity-building process targeted at periphery states 
to help them engage in the regional economic dynamic and draw them closer into core 
economic zones of the region” (Dent, 2008: 781). It is in accordance with such orienta-
tions that ADB undertook efforts to sponsor initiatives such as growth triangles and po-
sitioned itself as a pilot in promoting “regionally integrated markets and infrastructure 
systems” (Dent, 2008: 781). In post-Soviet Russia and Central Asia, the more recently 
established Eurasian Economic Community (EAEU) also explicitly aspired to operate 
as an opponent of the EU in the field of integration (Staeger, 2017).
The most severe challenges to the EU have, in fine, stemmed from evolutions with-
in the Union. Since the late 2000s, the EU has been facing a rising tide of Europhobia 
associated with, inter alia, the rise of populism, disunion over the management of the 
Eurozone and the migration crisis. This has also given way to unprecedented calls 
for incorporating disintegration into the neofunctionalist research agenda (Schmitter, 
Lefkofridi, 2016), as the uncertainty resulting from Britain’s June 2016 referendum in 
favour of Brexit, combined with gloomy scenarios on the fate of the Eurozone in the 
wake of the French presidential election of 2017. Since then, Theresa May’s negotia-
tions have turned into a call for European unity and a stinging reminder of an endless 
list of benefits (not least with respect to the EU’s decisive contribution to the return of 
peace in Ireland) that will no longer be available after March 2019.
thE study of africa as a lEns and a mirror
The processes at play across the African continent provide vital insights into cross-
border regionalisation processes and the interplay between territory, space and net-
works. This relates to five specific threads, associated with ideal-types that enable 
to shift away from binary oppositions (such as old vs. new regionalism, integration 
vs. cooperation, regime boosting vs. regional integration) in order to focus on the 
plurality of strategies and processes that coexist within regional organisations and 
landscapes. Accordingly, the following pages successively discusses the empirical 
and ideational legacies rooted in the (colonial or anti-colonial) past; the politics of 
region-building; the endorsement of holistic and developmental agendas; the inter-
play between trans-state networks and regionalisation processes and, finally, defrag-
mentation and connectivity.
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hysteresis: genealogies and mental maps
In Africa, the legacy of colonial amalgamation policies is part of the DNA of a large 
number of regional groupings and, more generally, shapes representations of fed-
eralism and regional initiatives in general. Similarly, the regionalist ideologies that 
challenged colour discrimination and colonialism (Pan-Africanism, Bolivarism, Pan-
Arabism, Pan-Asianism) still contribute to shape the goals and design of regional or-
ganisations.
Empire, colonial rule and decolonization were, in Africa, Latin America and the 
Middle East, as much about partition as about region-building. In the early days of 
post-colonial Latin America, Simon Bolivar hoped to preserve to the unity of former 
Spanish Latin American colonies through the establishment of the Federal Republic 
of Gran Colombia, drawn from the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Granada. The project 
subsequently faltered, yet Bolivarism still retains powerful political and ideological 
significance, as reflected by the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America 
(ALBA), launched in 2004 for the purpose of promoting social, political, and eco-
nomic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In Africa, the Southern African Customs Union/Common Monetary Area (SACU/
CMA) and the CFA franc currency zone offer another striking instance of continuity 
with colonial policies. In both cases, integration proceeds from the persistence of inte-
gration regimes that were conceived and implemented under colonial rule, hence their 
conceptualization through the notion of integration through hysteresis (Bach, 2017). 
In both cases, integration does not result from transfers of sovereign competences to 
supranational institutions, but from a renunciation to exercise their full sovereignty at 
independence, respectively in the fields of customs and currency. The genealogy of 
these integration schemes is clearly asymptomatic, since integration is not the outcome 
of transfers of sovereign competencies to a supranational core. Most member states of 
the CFA zone and the SACU never had the opportunity to exercise their sovereignty in 
the areas concerned. The stability of the CFA currency zone is still guaranteed by the 
French Treasury, while within the SACU, it is South Africa that, as in the past, domi-
nates and stabilizes what is in effect the oldest working customs union in the world.
Economic integration as politics
Unlike the notion of regional integration, regionalism has no difficulty to account for 
agendas which, as the track-record of Association of South-East Nations (ASEAN) 
illustrates, seek to promote region-building through sovereignty “enhancement” as op-
posed to the transfer and “pooling” of sovereignties (Higgot, 1995: 361–63). This is 
of particular relevance to the study of regional initiatives in Africa, across the Middle 
East and in Latin America, where member states have historically been prone to com-
bine stated commitments to the ideals of trans-regional integration with emphasis on 
strict respect for sovereignty and regime consolidation.
Accordingly, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was designed from the on-
set (1963) to promote Pan-African unity, but this objective was, in practice, relegated 
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to a distant and indefinite future. Regional governance was interpreted as strict non-in-
terference in regard to the domestic affairs of member states, decision-making through 
consensus and respect for the boundaries inherited at independence. Three interrelated 
notions contributed to shape the morphology and trajectory of African Inter-Govern-
mental Organizations (IGOs): the primacy of “club” diplomacy over bureaucratic and 
intergovernmental interactions, stated emphasis on regime consolidation and donor 
shopping. These three ingredients still form the least common denominator that glues 
together some regional groupings.
holistic and developmental agendas
The association of Africa’s regional organizations with holistic and developmental 
agendas is an offshoot of the revision of most of the founding charters and treaties of 
Africa’s regional groupings in the 1990s. Within a decade, the calls for a re-foundation 
of Pan-Africanism (Murithi, 2005) had translated into new agendas and institutional 
architectures that were strongly inspired by the EU (Adebajo, 2012: 45–82; Bach, 
2017: 81–85).
The identification of ambitious economic and financial integration goal posts went 
along with the adoption of norms and institutions designed to promote democracy 
and the rule of law, including through peace-keeping operations (PKOs) across the 
continent. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2001) actually set the founda-
tions for a fundamental policy shift that substituted the principle of non-indifference 
to the norm of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. This 
drastic overhaul of the normative tenets of the (O)AU also included those of the eight 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) earmarked to set the foundations for an Af-
rican Economic Community (AEC).
Two decades later the engagement of the AU and the RECs into PKOs has kept 
growing in conjunction with the formation of specific cultures in the field of security 
governance. Regional peace and security governance has also gained preeminence over 
the economic and financial blueprints meant to promote the establishment of a quasi-
federal and continental AEC.
trans-state and transregional networks
In Africa, the inability of states and regional organizations to implement policies de-
signed to loosen the effects of territorial fragmentation contrasts with the integrative 
power of (so-called informal) trans-state and trans-regional networks. The notion of 
trans-state networks and practices refers to patterns of regionalisation that, in contrast 
with trans-national flows and networks, owe their dynamism to processes of domes-
tication of state regulatory power. Trans-state networks thrive from their capacity to 
penetrate the territory of the state as much as its institutions (state capture).
The success of trans-state networks revolves around their capacity to bend rules 
and policies on at least one side of the border. Their ability to trade across borders 
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builds upon social, religious and geo-ethnic affiliations, as opposed to territorially an-
chored identities. As a result, their reach goes well beyond the borderlands and shapes 
spaces that are both mobile and socially defined. Trans-state networks cut across bor-
ders and penetrate state institutions at times, sometimes to the extent that they can 
freeze their capacity to produce public policies on specific issues. Another outcome is 
the emergence of trans-state and (due to the instrumentalization of the opportunities 
drawn from the globalisation of the world economy) trans-regional spaces that craft 
landscapes that thrive from the failure to implement institutionally defined regional 
agendas.
We have analysed in detail elsewhere (Bach, 2017: 52–76) how variations in the 
depth of the conversion of public resources into private gains refer to two prototypes 
that generate specific patterns of regionalisation. The first prototype contributes to the 
emergence of hubs and nodes associated with incentives to cross-border trade that are 
institutionally endorsed. In West Africa especially, this pattern gained preeminence in 
the 1970s and 1980s, when a small group of impoverished states (Benin, Niger, The 
Gambia and Togo) managed to turn boundaries with their immediate neighbours into 
valuable resources for both public and private operators (Igué, Soulé, 1993). Public 
support to “re-export” trade granted by state authorities in Gambia or Benin sharply 
contrasted with the treatment of cross-border flows as smuggling in Nigeria and Sen-
egal. However, this did not bring an end to ability of borderlanders to secure the good-
will of officers, bureaucrats and politicians on each side of the border.
These trade flows drew their strength from the association of porous boundaries 
with monetary, fiscal, tariff and normative opportunities embedded in distinctive sov-
ereignty regimes and macro-economic policies. For the players involved, this trans-
lates into an acute awareness of the adverse effects that would result from the closing 
of borders (for instance as a result of military tensions between neighbouring states) or 
from the drive towards a dilution of the tariff, fiscal or normative disparities that would 
result in the implementation of the plans towards an economic and monetary union 
prescribed by the charters of African regional groupings. As a result, it is paradoxical 
that where cross-border integration appears deeply established, institutionalization is 
most resisted.
The second broad prototype of trans-state regionalization revolves around the ex-
traction of cross-border dividends through the instrumentalisation (and privatisation) 
of violence and insecurity along with the penetration of government agencies by crimi-
nal groups (Neese Bybee, 2012). Since the 1990s, the Great Lakes region has become 
emblematic of such a pattern of regionalisation contributing to territorial fragmenta-
tion without formally challenging claims to territorial sovereignty. The key role played 
by entrepreneurs of insecurity in conjunction with such processes highlights once 
more the centrality of interactions with state policies and authorities. Across Africa, 
regionalisation through violence and insecurity has become associated with a growing 
number of conflicts ( Mazzitelli, 2007: 1071–1090), and the exploitation of opportuni-
ties, ranging from the extraction of rare minerals (Great Lakes region), to the transit of 
illicit drugs (in the Sahel) and the enslavement of human beings (Boko Haram in the 
Lake Chad region). Not surprisingly, the ability to exploit the edge effects of frontiers 
relate to situations of governance without government.
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defragmentation and connectivity
In North-East Asia and the Pacific it is essentially through nationally anchored and 
driven policy reforms that the momentum towards the elimination of import quotas, 
non-tariff barriers and customs duties has gained consistency since the 1980s. The es-
tablishment of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or Free Trade Agreements (FTA) is 
today branded as a distinctive path towards “deep” regional integration, the outcome 
of bilateral or multilateral pledges undertaken by states that remain in control of imple-
mentation. In such cases, as in the case of national policy orientations meant to attract 
or boost private investment, policies are not supervised by supranational institutions.
The metaphor of defragmentation alludes to the computer world where the “de-
frag” function aims to restore and speed up hard disk efficiency by consolidating pro-
grammes that are scattered in different locations. The term also refers to the promotion 
of “deeper” regional integration through the removal of non-tariff and regulatory bar-
riers that limit the movement of goods, services, peoples and capital across borders 
(World Bank, 2012: xv). As a result, the logics of defragmentation intrinsically pos-
tulate the dilution of the frontiers between national, regional and global integration, 
and the adoption of leaner functionally driven institutional architectures. In this sense 
“deep” integration represents a departure from regional institutions that aim to pro-
mote integration through sovereignty pooling and holistic agenda.
The dissemination of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and 
sub-Sahara Africa’s transformation into a global economic frontier have contributed to 
stimulate and rejuvenate the demand for improved connectivity. This reflects through 
the growing synergies between new (cell phone) technology and banking, but also 
through the boost to mega-infrastructure projects designed to link land-locked and 
coastal states more efficiently. Connectivity, as it infers the introduction of new tech-
nologies, has led to a reassessment of what infrastructure development stands for, the 
hard versus soft dichotomy. Global pressure to enhance competitiveness stimulates 
the demand for new seamless cross-border transport infrastructures, and the establish-
ment of more reliable energy grids. Again, the distinction between regional and global 
integration is diluted here.
Defragmentation is tied to the notion of “deep” integration that has become asso-
ciated with free trade agreements involving the removal of non-tariff and regulatory 
barriers, a response to the rise of intra-firm trade and services. In Africa, defrag-
mentation has also become a shortcut for the revival of functionally driven proj-
ects, especially in the field of hard and soft infrastructure development. In the past 
decade, a new generation of Tripartite and Continental Free Trade Agreements has 
emerged in Africa, prompted, at least initially, by the search for an alternative path to 
the adoption of mutually exclusive customs arrangements by the regional economic 
communities.
The conclusion of the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (CETA) and China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) are the latest expressions of a momentum that retains its glo-
bal relevance despite Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the USA from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) agreement in January 2017. Chinese investment into cross-regional 
infrastructures contributes to weaving hub-and-spoke interactions with harbours, free 
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trade zones and infrastructure nodes that radiate well beyond the old Silk Road. During 
the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2017, no less than 1,500 delegates 
representing 130 countries were in attendance. The dynamics at play point to a dilution 
of the frontiers between local, regional and global arenas, but also a strategic shift of 
trade routes that confers new centrality to hubs located in East Africa, Central Asia and 
the Gulf.
Deep integration circumvents the problems of loss or delegation of sovereignty to 
the benefit of supranational institutions, but ushers equally intrusive constraints since 
member states of the FTAs remain solely accountable for their policy orientations. 
Transforming border and “behind the border” cultures and practices rests upon the 
capacity of states to craft and implement smart public policies. The relevant scale for 
decision-making, as highlighted by the trajectory of the Asian developmental states, 
is not so much the region as the state. Of key relevance here is its regulatory and 
developmental capacity, namely the ability to undertake and pursue long term strate-
gies, apt to sustain value-added industries that are competitive in local and, eventually, 
international markets.
* * *
This text has argued that shifting away from the world of regions (Katzenstein, 2005) 
in order to study the world of regionalisms (Bach, 2017) enables to account for the 
diversity of landscapes and patterns of interaction between and across regions. Africa, 
despite its longstanding treatment as a peripheral region, offers a perfect arena to re-
view the heuristic implications of the coexistence of distinct threads of regionalism. 
The five prototypes that we have identified provide a matrix that is informed by ongo-
ing developments and draws from the conceptual legacy of the new regionalism litera-
ture and the equally significant contributions of constructivist and border studies. They 
also provide an incentive to revisit the dynamics at play within and across the EU.
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aBstract
The surge of diversified forms of regionalism and regional integration within the past few 
decades has stimulated the reappraisal of the conceptual tools traditionally designed to bench-
mark and monitor region-building processes across the world. More recently, the Brexit ne-
gotiations have become a reminder that the EU remains an unfolding experience. This article 
argues that the study of African regionalisms constitutes a timely invitation to revisit the 
experience of the EU and its contribution to the world of regionalisms. After a brief survey of 
the classic definition of the region, we will discuss the ongoing relevance of European inte-
gration and the implications of the analytical distinction between regionalism, regionalisation 
and regional integration, before drawing from the study of Africa five threads which set the 
basis for a comparative study of regions and regionalisms beyond the classic emphasis on the 
EU or the world of regions.
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EUROPA W ŚWIECIE REGIONALIZMÓW 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Powstanie różnorodnych form regionalizacji oraz integracji regionalnej w przeciągu ostat-
nich dekad stymulowało ponowną ocenę konceptualnych narzędzi, tradycyjnie skonstruowanych 
w celu tworzenia punktów odniesienia oraz monitorowania procesu regionalizacji na świecie. 
Negocjacje w sprawie Brexitu przypomniały, iż sama Unia Europejska pozostaje zmieniającą 
się rzeczywistością. Główna teza poniższego artykułu zakłada, iż studiowanie Afrykańskich 
procesów regionalizacji stanowi zaproszenie do ponownego przeanalizowania doświadczeń 
Unii Europejskiej oraz jej miejsca w świecie regionalizacji. Po krótkim przeglądzie klasycz-
nych definicji regionu, omówione zostanie współczesne znaczenie integracji europejskiej oraz 
implikacji rozróżnienia regionalizmu, regionalizacji oraz integracji regionalnej. Przed wycią-
gnięciem wniosków płynących ze studiowania Afrykańskich regionalizmów, przedstawione zo-
stanie pięć kategorii, które stanowią podstawę badań wychodzących poza klasyczne spojrzenie 
na Unię Europejską oraz świat regionów.
 
Słowa kluczowe: regionalizacja, integracja regionalna, Europa, Brexit, UE, Afryka
